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The family small-business agricultural enterprise (family farm) has economic and social distinctions from corporate farms. Small farm producers view their data with a sense of personal privacy and protection.<ref name="SykutaBig16" /> Small businesses often use their internet-linked home computer for both personal and business activities, increasing the risk of cyber-attack<ref name="NASSFarm13">{{cite web |url=https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/h128nd689?locale=en |title=Farm Computer Usage and Ownership |author=National Agricultural Statistics Service |publisher=U.S. Department of Agriculture |date=20 August 2013 |accessdate=27 October 2018}}</ref><ref name="GeilCyber18">{{cite journal |title=Cyber security on the farm: An assessment of cyber security practices in the United States agriculture industry |journal=International Food and Agribusiness Management Review |author=Geil, A.; Sagers, G.; Spaulding, A.D. et al. |volume=21 |isssue=3 |pages=317–34 |year-2018 |doi=10.22434/IFAMR2017.0045}}</ref>; over 20% of small businesses get hacked.<ref name="GeilCyber18" /> Generally, small farms and agribusinesses are not comfortable adopting computer security technology (selecting, configuring, managing) although they recognize its relevance and value. Moderate-sized agribusinesses, including many food processing companies and supporting industries, are vulnerable since cyberattacks are often targeted against organizations with more than 100 employees.<ref name="GeilCyber18" /> Additionally, the food and agriculture system includes military food production—such as the manufacturing of packaged meals for soldiers—which has a high potential for sabotage.<ref name="ColbertTheGame18">{{cite journal |title=The game-theoretic model and experimental investigation of cyber wargaming |journal=The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology |author=Colbert, E.J.M.; Kott, A.; Knachel, L.P. |pages=1–18 |year-2018 |doi=10.1177/1548512918795061}}</ref> It is important to note that attackers need not know details of the food manufacturing process. Attackers need only know technical methods for exploiting the machinery or the process, such as lowering the temperature on meat cookers before packaging.<ref name="ColbertTable15">{{cite book |title=Table-Top Exercise Final Report: Intrusion Detection Capabilities for US Army SCADA Systems: Information Packet |author=Colbert, E.; Sullivan, D.; Wong, K. et al. |series=US Army Research Lab Technical Report ARL-TR-7498 |year=2015}}</ref><ref name="ColbertRED15">{{cite book |title=RED and BLUE Teaming of a US Army SCADA System: Table-Top Exercise Final Report |author=Colbert, E.; Sullivan, D.; Wong, K. et al. |series=US Army Research Lab Technical Report ARL-TR-7497 |year=2015}}</ref>
The family small-business agricultural enterprise (family farm) has economic and social distinctions from corporate farms. Small farm producers view their data with a sense of personal privacy and protection.<ref name="SykutaBig16" /> Small businesses often use their internet-linked home computer for both personal and business activities, increasing the risk of cyber-attack<ref name="NASSFarm13">{{cite web |url=https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/h128nd689?locale=en |title=Farm Computer Usage and Ownership |author=National Agricultural Statistics Service |publisher=U.S. Department of Agriculture |date=20 August 2013 |accessdate=27 October 2018}}</ref><ref name="GeilCyber18">{{cite journal |title=Cyber security on the farm: An assessment of cyber security practices in the United States agriculture industry |journal=International Food and Agribusiness Management Review |author=Geil, A.; Sagers, G.; Spaulding, A.D. et al. |volume=21 |isssue=3 |pages=317–34 |year-2018 |doi=10.22434/IFAMR2017.0045}}</ref>; over 20% of small businesses get hacked.<ref name="GeilCyber18" /> Generally, small farms and agribusinesses are not comfortable adopting computer security technology (selecting, configuring, managing) although they recognize its relevance and value. Moderate-sized agribusinesses, including many food processing companies and supporting industries, are vulnerable since cyberattacks are often targeted against organizations with more than 100 employees.<ref name="GeilCyber18" /> Additionally, the food and agriculture system includes military food production—such as the manufacturing of packaged meals for soldiers—which has a high potential for sabotage.<ref name="ColbertTheGame18">{{cite journal |title=The game-theoretic model and experimental investigation of cyber wargaming |journal=The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology |author=Colbert, E.J.M.; Kott, A.; Knachel, L.P. |pages=1–18 |year-2018 |doi=10.1177/1548512918795061}}</ref> It is important to note that attackers need not know details of the food manufacturing process. Attackers need only know technical methods for exploiting the machinery or the process, such as lowering the temperature on meat cookers before packaging.<ref name="ColbertTable15">{{cite book |title=Table-Top Exercise Final Report: Intrusion Detection Capabilities for US Army SCADA Systems: Information Packet |author=Colbert, E.; Sullivan, D.; Wong, K. et al. |series=US Army Research Lab Technical Report ARL-TR-7498 |year=2015}}</ref><ref name="ColbertRED15">{{cite book |title=RED and BLUE Teaming of a US Army SCADA System: Table-Top Exercise Final Report |author=Colbert, E.; Sullivan, D.; Wong, K. et al. |series=US Army Research Lab Technical Report ARL-TR-7497 |year=2015}}</ref>


The incorporation of cyber-based technologies and data driven solutions in farm production, food processing, supplier industries, transport of goods, regulatory oversight, and marketing sales and communication with consumers creates a paradigm shift.<ref name="BoghossianThreats18" /> Cloud-based storage of large data sets, use of open-sourced or internet/cloud-based software, and corporate management of proprietary software each increase opportunities for data access by unauthorized users. Within the food and agriculture system, the use of biological and genetic analytical technologies within research [[Laboratory|laboratories]] is widespread for the evaluation of food quality, identification of zoonotic disease, and animal and plant health. Additionally, the use of [[bioinformatics]] and genetic technologies is enhancing the rate of development of new products and crops. Public trust and acceptance are key to incorporating advanced technologies into the food and agriculture system.<ref name="WintleATrans17" /><ref name=NIFAData16">{{cite web |url=https://nifa.usda.gov/sites/default/files/resource/Stakeholder%20Ideas%20Engine%20Input%20-%20Summary%5B1%5D.pdf |format=PDF |title=Data Summit: Changing the Face, Place, and Space of Agriculture |author=National Institute of Food and Agriculture |publisher=U.S. Department of Agriculture |date=01 November 2016 |accessdate=28 October 2018}}</ref> Interdependency of information technology with biological output creates opportunities for new bio-threats, which can harm public trust; transparency is valued.<ref name="NASEMSafe15" /> When public opinion is turned against a technical advancement, policy and protection strategies may cause more harm than the actual threat itself.<ref name="WintleATrans17" />


Holistically, the ramifications of a failure to provide cyber biosecurity of the food and agriculture system fall into several general categories<ref name="BoghossianThreats18" />:
* Threats to confidentiality—data privacy
** Data exposure (e.g., naïve exposure of data by individuals, cyber security gaps in small businesses, or laboratories to potential threats)
** Capturing private data with intent to aggregate data for profit or predictive advantage
* Threats to integrity—theft or destruction of intellectual property/productivity disruptions, and safety risks
** Intellectual property theft (e.g., advances in plant and animal varieties and genetics)
** Manipulation of critical automated (computer-based) processes (e.g., thermal processing time and temperature for food safety)
** Seizing control of robotics or autonomous vehicles (e.g., failure to perform, overriding of precise function)
* Threats to availability—disruption of agricultural/food production and supply
* Misinformation influencing trust and cooperation within the food and agriculture system and/or consumers
* Lack of equipment, supplies, or end-products to meet expectations
* Lack of ability to perform vulnerability assessments and develop emergency response plans (e.g., protection of rivers, surface waters, and drinking water supplies)
The food and agricultural industries are at a critical point as the development and use of biological, genetic, precision, and information technologies expand and intersect. Collectively, there is a need to evaluate potential liabilities and understand the vulnerabilities of biological and genetic data systems.


==References==
==References==

Revision as of 22:29, 8 April 2019

Full article title Cyberbiosecurity: A new perspective on protecting U.S. food and agricultural system
Journal Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology
Author(s) Duncan, Susan E.; Reinhard, Robert; Williams, Robert C.; Ramsey, Ford; Thomason, Wade;
Lee, Kiho; Dudek, Nancy; Mostaghimi, Saied; Colbert, Edward; Murch, Randall
Author affiliation(s) Virginia Tech, Tyson Foods
Primary contact Email: duncans at vt dot edu
Editors Morse, Stephen Allen
Year published 2019
Volume and issue 7
Page(s) 63
DOI 10.3389/fbioe.2019.00063
ISSN 2296-4185
Distribution license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Website https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00063/full
Download https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00063/pdf (PDF)

Abstract

Our national data and infrastructure security issues affecting the “bioeconomy” are evolving rapidly. Simultaneously, the conversation about cybersecurity of the U.S. food and agricultural system (cyber biosecurity) is incomplete and disjointed. The food and agricultural production sectors influence over 20% of the nation's economy ($6.7T) and 15% of U.S. employment (43.3M jobs). The food and agricultural sectors are immensely diverse, and they require advanced technologies and efficiencies that rely on computer technologies, big data, cloud-based data storage, and internet accessibility. There is a critical need to safeguard the cyber biosecurity of our bioeconomy, but currently protections are minimal and do not broadly exist across the food and agricultural system. Using the food safety management Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) system concept as an introductory point of reference, we identify important features in broad food and agricultural production and food systems: dairy, food animals, row crops, fruits and vegetables, and environmental resources (water). This analysis explores the relevant concepts of cyber biosecurity from food production to the end product user (such as the consumer) and considers the integration of diverse transportation, supplier, and retailer networks. We describe common challenges and unique barriers across these systems and recommend solutions to advance the role of cyber biosecurity in the food and agricultural sectors.

Keywords: plant, animal, food, cyber biosecurity, biosecurity, cyber security, agriculture, bioeconomy

Introduction: Food and agriculture cyberbiosecurity at the interface of biosecurity and cybersecurity

Public trust and confidence in the food supply are critical and influential on acceptance of data-driven innovations and technologies within the food and agriculture systems. Cyberbiosecurity is a nascent paradigm and discipline at the interface of biosafety/biosecurity, cybersecurity, and cyber-physical security (Figure 1).[1] This new discipline has emerged alongside “big data” with the extensive and ever-increasing reliance of the life sciences on information systems technologies, rapid and profitable expansion of life science discoveries, and the growth of the U.S. bioeconomy. Protecting biological data and information within the life sciences has unique differences from the more familiar biosafety and biosecurity approaches.[2] While the latter two categories address biological risks and threats, they do not protect against harm created when computational and information technology-dependent systems are threatened or corrupted. Just as food safety regulations target the protection of human health, incorporating cyber biosecurity strategies for the food and agriculture industries is a protective step in securing the food supply. Such efforts have the power to positively influence lives and protect the bioeconomy. Cyberbiosecurity can improve the security and stability of domestic and global food and agriculture systems. United States innovation in this realm is routinely studied and adopted around the globe, and as such, the U.S. can provide insight and leadership in cyber biosecurity of global food and agriculture systems.


Fig1 Duncan FrontBioengBiotech2019 7.jpg

Fig. 1 Cyberbiosecurity is an emerging discipline for protecting life sciences data, functions and operations (or infrastructure), and the bio economy

Integrated scientific, mathematical, computational, and engineering advancements in regenerative biology, genetics and breeding technologies, plant-derived vaccine and animal therapies, biological design and testing automation, and other activities are rapidly leading to development of biotechnological and agricultural applications of direct relevance to the food and agriculture system.[3][4] The translation and application of data-driven technologies for precision agriculture, autonomous systems, bio-automated processing and data recording, and other technologies yields large data sets of economic and bio-based information for agribusinesses.[5] Such advances require high throughput processing, data management and integration, bio-automation, and other computer-based management of biological data. These advances increase efficiencies, decision processes, and output within the food and agricultural system. However, such information is susceptible to ownership policy challenges, theft, and cyberattack as users may not be alert to potential vulnerabilities nor be trained in effective protections and security strategies.[5][6] Unprotected or weakly protected systems are susceptible to unwanted surveillance, intrusions into data systems, and cyber-activities targeted toward malicious attack. Cyberbiosecurity threats include inappropriate access to systems, data, or analytical technologies and the use or corruption of the information accessed to cause harm within life science-focused research, production, processing, and use. Examples of data-driven, high-value food and agricultural products susceptible to cyber threat include high-yielding and specialty agricultural crops, high performance livestock, biopharma fermented molecules developed through advanced breeding and genomics, biotechnology advancements, and “big data” analyses.[7] As technology advances, all parts of society, from governmental agencies to public health and manufacturing, rely more on advanced biological systems with big data and technologies that utilize such information. The identification and mitigation of cyber biosecurity threats will become increasingly important.

Vulnerability of the food and agricultural system and the bioeconomy

The U.S. food and agriculture system, influencing 20% ($6.7T) of the domestic bio economy[8], represents a significant risk to global food security. The data science market value for agriculture is estimated in excess of $20B.[5] The food and agriculture system is composed of many sectors that are not well-integrated, is widely dispersed geographically, and has huge diversity in size (number of employees) and capacity. Most of the economic value is generated by large, multinational corporate enterprises. Conversely, small family-owned farming operations account for 90% of U.S. farms, which yield 24% of the value of agricultural production.[9]

The family small-business agricultural enterprise (family farm) has economic and social distinctions from corporate farms. Small farm producers view their data with a sense of personal privacy and protection.[5] Small businesses often use their internet-linked home computer for both personal and business activities, increasing the risk of cyber-attack[10][11]; over 20% of small businesses get hacked.[11] Generally, small farms and agribusinesses are not comfortable adopting computer security technology (selecting, configuring, managing) although they recognize its relevance and value. Moderate-sized agribusinesses, including many food processing companies and supporting industries, are vulnerable since cyberattacks are often targeted against organizations with more than 100 employees.[11] Additionally, the food and agriculture system includes military food production—such as the manufacturing of packaged meals for soldiers—which has a high potential for sabotage.[12] It is important to note that attackers need not know details of the food manufacturing process. Attackers need only know technical methods for exploiting the machinery or the process, such as lowering the temperature on meat cookers before packaging.[13][14]

The incorporation of cyber-based technologies and data driven solutions in farm production, food processing, supplier industries, transport of goods, regulatory oversight, and marketing sales and communication with consumers creates a paradigm shift.[6] Cloud-based storage of large data sets, use of open-sourced or internet/cloud-based software, and corporate management of proprietary software each increase opportunities for data access by unauthorized users. Within the food and agriculture system, the use of biological and genetic analytical technologies within research laboratories is widespread for the evaluation of food quality, identification of zoonotic disease, and animal and plant health. Additionally, the use of bioinformatics and genetic technologies is enhancing the rate of development of new products and crops. Public trust and acceptance are key to incorporating advanced technologies into the food and agriculture system.[4][15] Interdependency of information technology with biological output creates opportunities for new bio-threats, which can harm public trust; transparency is valued.[7] When public opinion is turned against a technical advancement, policy and protection strategies may cause more harm than the actual threat itself.[4]

Holistically, the ramifications of a failure to provide cyber biosecurity of the food and agriculture system fall into several general categories[6]:

  • Threats to confidentiality—data privacy
    • Data exposure (e.g., naïve exposure of data by individuals, cyber security gaps in small businesses, or laboratories to potential threats)
    • Capturing private data with intent to aggregate data for profit or predictive advantage
  • Threats to integrity—theft or destruction of intellectual property/productivity disruptions, and safety risks
    • Intellectual property theft (e.g., advances in plant and animal varieties and genetics)
    • Manipulation of critical automated (computer-based) processes (e.g., thermal processing time and temperature for food safety)
    • Seizing control of robotics or autonomous vehicles (e.g., failure to perform, overriding of precise function)
  • Threats to availability—disruption of agricultural/food production and supply
  • Misinformation influencing trust and cooperation within the food and agriculture system and/or consumers
  • Lack of equipment, supplies, or end-products to meet expectations
  • Lack of ability to perform vulnerability assessments and develop emergency response plans (e.g., protection of rivers, surface waters, and drinking water supplies)

The food and agricultural industries are at a critical point as the development and use of biological, genetic, precision, and information technologies expand and intersect. Collectively, there is a need to evaluate potential liabilities and understand the vulnerabilities of biological and genetic data systems.

References

  1. ↑ Murch, R.S.; So, W.K.; Buchholz, W.G. et al. (2018). "Cyberbiosecurity: An Emerging New Discipline to Help Safeguard the Bioeconomy". Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology 6: 39. doi:10.3389/fbioe.2018.00039. 
  2. ↑ Peccoud, J.; Gallegos, J.E.; Murch, R. et al. (2018). "Cyberbiosecurity: From Naive Trust to Risk Awareness". Trends in Biotechnology 36 (1): 4–7. doi:10.1016/j.tibtech.2017.10.012. PMID 29224719. 
  3. ↑ Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology; Board on Life Sciences (2014). Meeting Recap: Workshop - Convergence: Safeguarding Technology in the Bioeconomy. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Wintle, B.C.; Boehm, C.R.; Rhodes, C. et al. (2017). "A transatlantic perspective on 20 emerging issues in biological engineering". eLife 3: e30247. doi:10.7554/eLife.30247. PMC PMC5685469. PMID 29132504. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5685469. 
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 Sykuta, M.E. (2016). "Big data in agriculture: Property rights, privacy and competition in ag data services". International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 19 (A): 57–74. https://www.ifama.org/Volume-19-Issue-A. 
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Boghossian, A.; Linsky, S.; Brown, A. et al. (2018). "Threats to Precision Agriculture" (PDF). U.S. Department of Homeland Security. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2018%20AEP_Threats_to_Precision_Agriculture.pdf. Retrieved 08 January 2019. 
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology (2015) (PDF). Meeting Recap: Safeguarding the Bioeconomy: Applications and Implications of Emerging Science. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. https://www.ehidc.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/Safeguarding%20the%20Bioeconomy_II_Recap%20Final%20090815.pdf. 
  8. ↑ "What is the Food and Ag Industries’ Impact in Your Community?". Feeding the Economy. 2018. https://feedingtheeconomy.com/. Retrieved 28 October 2018. 
  9. ↑ MacDonald, J.M.; Hoppe, R.A. (6 March 2017). "Large Family Farms Continue To Dominate U.S. Agricultural Production". Amber Waves. U.S. Department of Agriculture. https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017/march/large-family-farms-continue-to-dominate-us-agricultural-production/. Retrieved 28 October 2018. 
  10. ↑ National Agricultural Statistics Service (20 August 2013). "Farm Computer Usage and Ownership". U.S. Department of Agriculture. https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/h128nd689?locale=en. Retrieved 27 October 2018. 
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 Geil, A.; Sagers, G.; Spaulding, A.D. et al.. "Cyber security on the farm: An assessment of cyber security practices in the United States agriculture industry". International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 21: 317–34. doi:10.22434/IFAMR2017.0045. 
  12. ↑ Colbert, E.J.M.; Kott, A.; Knachel, L.P.. "The game-theoretic model and experimental investigation of cyber wargaming". The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology: 1–18. doi:10.1177/1548512918795061. 
  13. ↑ Colbert, E.; Sullivan, D.; Wong, K. et al. (2015). Table-Top Exercise Final Report: Intrusion Detection Capabilities for US Army SCADA Systems: Information Packet. US Army Research Lab Technical Report ARL-TR-7498. 
  14. ↑ Colbert, E.; Sullivan, D.; Wong, K. et al. (2015). RED and BLUE Teaming of a US Army SCADA System: Table-Top Exercise Final Report. US Army Research Lab Technical Report ARL-TR-7497. 
  15. ↑ National Institute of Food and Agriculture (1 November 2016). "Data Summit: Changing the Face, Place, and Space of Agriculture" (PDF). U.S. Department of Agriculture. https://nifa.usda.gov/sites/default/files/resource/Stakeholder%20Ideas%20Engine%20Input%20-%20Summary%5B1%5D.pdf. Retrieved 28 October 2018. 

Notes

This presentation is faithful to the original, with only a few minor changes to presentation, grammar, and punctuation. In some cases important information was missing from the references, and that information was added.

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