User:Shawndouglas/sandbox/sublevel45
Numerous organizations have taken up the mantle in developing and disseminating cloud compliance standards, guidelines, and recommendations since the late 2000s, some independently (e.g., the Storage Networking Industry Association) and others by government mandate (e.g., National Institute of Standards and Technology). Some organizations have tailored their content to a specific industry (e.g., PCI Security Standards Council and the financial industry), while others have focused on a sector of business (e.g., FedRAMP and the U.S. Federal government). As the development of these standards, guidelines, and recommendations has continued, the groundwork has been created for future updates. NIST's early work with its SP 500-293 NIST Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap, Volume I and II and SP 500-299 NIST Cloud Computing Security Reference Architecture (Figure 3) have gone on to further define a modern approach to categorizing, evaluating, comparing, and selecting cloud services.[1] And those documents were influenced by even earlier work by the Cloud Security Alliance's Enterprise Architecture efforts.[2]
The work to improve and expand upon existing standards continues today, even as new service models for cloud computing emerge. Examples of the prior mentioned and other organizations contributing to these efforts are shown in Table 3.
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However, organizational standards, guidelines, and recommendations alone do not influence how cloud computing services can and should be implemented and operated. Regulatory bodies, legislative bodies, and government agencies also directly or indirectly have an impact on cloud service operations. In some cases, the law, regulation, or guidance coming from such bodies may not even mention "cloud computing," yet because they mandate how specific data and information can be managed, used, and distributed, they ultimately influence what a cloud service provider (CSP) does and how they do it. This can be observed by more than a few of the examples in Table 4. The California Consumer Privacy Act, for example, makes no mention of the word "cloud," but CSPs and cloud users alike must consider aspects of the regulation, e.g., what can and cannot be done with a consumer's information based on location of the stored information.[21]
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While Big Tech was as early as 2010 asking the U.S. government to take a more proactive regulatory approach to cloud computing[35], actual direct regulation of cloud computing by the world's governments has been limited.[36][37] This leads to complicated viewpoints about the value of regulation vs. its drawbacks. Yes, careful regulation can help ensure consistent, affordable, and secure access to cloud services and may even encourage organizations to adopt the technology.[36] However, a headstrong approach to regulations for CSPs, without sector- and industry-specific considerations, may have unintended consequences, e.g., unduly raising compliance costs or forcing insufficient levels of access control on an entity.[36]
At least in the U.S., lawmakers and regulators may soon be pressured to increase regulatory approaches to cloud computing. This may be driven by the increasingly concentrated nature of cloud services in a handful of tech giants, though at the same time hampered by the widely varying approaches to addressing cloud-related issues via policy and regulation at the national and international levels. First, the very nature of these cloud services—and the ever increasing criticality they attain—as centralized services ensures the regulatory eye will increasingly be placed upon those cloud vendors. In fact, discussion about and designation of cloud services as critical infrastructure is already occurring in earnest, as they have "become essential to the performance of a growing swath of other sectors that have not heretofore been massively dependent on centralized cloud functionalities, and hence vulnerable to their disruption."[36][38] This may lead to policymakers, regulatory bodies, and legislators being left with little choice but to move forward with more policy and regulation. Second, and consequently, the development of such policy and regulation may not occur in a manner more unified with global perceptions but rather largely based upon localized values, interests, and priorities. The failure here is the lack of recognition of CSPs as being integral to individual, retail, corporate, organizational, and government operations around the globe, i.e. their centralized and concentrated position within a changing computing paradigm. As such, greater effort must be made by policymakers, regulators, and legislatures to find at least a minimum level of "compatibility and reconciliation" with other existing governance mechanisms, while carefully addressing both security of operation and operational robustness in tandem, such that there is greater harmonization globally.[36] And through government-level support of harmonized controls—as well as a vested interest in promoting the responsible "development, dissemination, and operation of cloud infrastructure"—cloud users will stand a greater chance of reaping the economic benefits of adopting cloud computing.[36]
Current and future regulatory action applies to several areas of cloud computing. How a CSP responds to and notifies affected users of a security breach is one concern. Currently the U.S. government doesn't fully address in a unified fashion aspects of cloud security breaches such as protection obligations, reporting time, and required notification parties, nor any compensation mechanism for those affected.[39] (All U.S. states and most territories do have their own flavor of breach notification legislation[40], but like cannabis law, this is problematic in the face of a strong divergence with federal law or lack thereof.) The applications and algorithms that drive and collect data from users of cloud-enabled applications may also face regulatory scrutiny or control by a national government, as was seen with both China's and the U.S.'s scrutiny of the TikTok application, its algorithms, and its security.[36][41][42] Data localization also remains a significant area of cloud computing regulation, not just for security concerns but also industrial policy, economic policy, privacy concerns, and human rights concerns.[36] Other areas of concern that may see regulation include interoperability and portability, digital preservation (retention) obligations, and cross-border data transfer.
And then there's the proverbial "elephant in the room": overall data privacy and protection considerations in the cloud. This is a major concern typically because of statutes—like the California Consumer Privacy Act[22]—that broadly protect a collective of affected individuals and how their cloud data is collected, preserved, organized, stored, and used not only within the governing entity (e.g., state, country, political and economic union) but also as its transferred to and from the governing entity. The previously mentioned data localization and cross-border data transfer issues fall under this heading.[43] These often prove to be some of the most challenging regulations to develop, as lawmakers and regulators don't always anticipate the rate of change of technology. They're also difficult for CSPs and organizations to comply with, particularly due to the variance in requirements among all governing entities' laws.[43]
Other approaches to regulation also affect how cloud computing services are implemented and managed. For example, rather than taking a broad approach towards regulation, addressing everyone providing and/or using cloud services, it's possible that regulators and legislators may take a more focused, sector-based approach. But that comes with its own set of problems, as Maurer and Hinck noted in their 2020 Carnegie Endowment paper[38]:
[T]he impact of a cloud security incident usually depends on what type of data or service is affected. Thus, the most suitable potential regulatory requirements with respect to security may differ across sectors that deal with different types of data—from the highly sensitive, fast-moving data common in the financial sector to the more privacy-sensitive personal data used by medical service providers. However, crafting regulation on a sector-by-sector basis would likely create conflicting requirements and incomplete standards.
Finally, as a third option, rather than direct regulation of the broad market or even specific sectors, some governments may simply use their considerable weight to influence how CSPs provide their services, influencing future regulation, as Levite and Kalwani note in their 2020 paper for the Carnegie Endowment[36]:
Finally, some of the efforts to influence CSP behavior may not come through explicit regulation, but rather through exercise of the government’s market power. Cloud adoption strategies and trends in e-governance have made governments some of the largest and most important clients of CSPs. Governments will likely use their market clout and status as a large and powerful consumer as a source of leverage over industry to set standards of contracting fairness and other provisions that transcend the immediate cloud service contracts they enter. While formally these provisions will only apply to government contracts, they could over time cross over to public clouds as well, or at least help set precedents that drive regulatory attention and inform industry standards. Yet over the longer run, government privatization of many services might actually weaken their leverage, given lock-in issues. How the balance between the two parties ultimately will play out remains to be seen.
Whatever direction regulators and legislators take, it ideally will be done with thorough consideration of how to implement regulation, as well as the potential effects regulation will have on various markets.
References
- ↑ Simmon, E.D. (23 February 2018). "Evaluation of Cloud Computing Services Based on NIST SP 800-145". NIST. https://www.nist.gov/publications/evaluation-cloud-computing-services-based-nist-sp-800-145. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "CSA Enterprise Architecture Reference Guide v2". Cloud Security Alliance. 2020. https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/artifacts/enterprise-architecture-reference-guide-v2/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "Ultimate Guide to G-Cloud". AdviceCloud. https://advice-cloud.co.uk/ultimate-guide-gcloud/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "About DMTF". DMTF. https://www.dmtf.org/about. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "About ETSI". European Telecommunications Standards Institute. https://www.etsi.org/about. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 "FedRAMP". General Services Administration. https://www.fedramp.gov/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "Program Basics". General Services Administration. https://www.fedramp.gov/program-basics/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ IEEE Cloud Computing Initiative. "Standards in Cloud Computing". IEEE Standards Association. https://cloudcomputing.ieee.org/standards. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "ICS > 35: 35.210 Cloud Computing". International Organization for Standardization. https://www.iso.org/ics/35.210/x/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "About International Telecommunication Union (ITU)". International Telecommunication Union. https://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "Standards Acceleration to Jumpstart Adoption of Cloud Computing (SAJACC)". National Institute of Standards and Technology. 3 June 2018. https://www.nist.gov/itl/standards-acceleration-jumpstart-adoption-cloud-computing-sajacc. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "NIST Cloud Computing Program - NCCP". National Institute of Standards and Technology. 9 July 2019. https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/nist-cloud-computing-program-nccp. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "Cloud Working Group". Object Management Group. https://www.omg.org/cloud/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "Open Grid Forum". Open Grid Forum. https://www.ogf.org/ogf/doku.php. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "About Us". OASIS Open. https://www.oasis-open.org/org/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "About Us". PCI Security Standards Council. https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/about_us/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "Vision and Mission". Storage Networking Industry Association. https://www.snia.org/about/vision-mission. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "Standards Portfolio". Storage Networking Industry Association. https://www.snia.org/tech_activities/standards/curr_standards. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "The Open Group". The Open Group. https://www.opengroup.org/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "About Us". TM Forum. https://www.tmforum.org/about-tm-forum/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "TITLE 1.81.5. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 [1798.100 - 1798.199.100"]. California Legislative Information. Legislative Counsel Bureau. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?division=3.&part=4.&lawCode=CIV&title=1.81.5. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ 22.0 22.1 22.2 "California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)". Google Cloud. https://cloud.google.com/security/compliance/ccpa. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 Guseyva, V. (18 September 2020). "Data residency laws by country: An overview". InCountry. https://incountry.com/blog/data-residency-laws-by-country-overview/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "UK’s Cloud Security Principles". Google Cloud. https://cloud.google.com/security/compliance/uk-ncsc. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "What is the Difference between FISMA and FedRAMP?". PaloAlto Networks. 2021. https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/difference-between-fisma-and-fedramp. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ 26.0 26.1 "Google Cloud & the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)". Google Cloud. https://cloud.google.com/security/gdpr. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ 27.0 27.1 "BaFin Cloud Outsourcing Guidance". Google Cloud. https://cloud.google.com/security/compliance/bafin. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ 28.0 28.1 Office for Civil Rights (24 November 2020). "Guidance on HIPAA & Cloud Computing". Health Information Privacy. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/health-information-technology/cloud-computing/index.html. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "Joint Statement: Security in a Cloud Computing Environment" (PDF). 30 April 2020. https://www.ffiec.gov/press/PDF/FFIEC_Cloud_Computing_Statement.pdf. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ Ross, S.; Scott, K. (6 May 2020). "US bank regulators issue cloud computing security guidance". Financial Services: Regulation Tomorrow. Norton Rose Fulbright. https://www.regulationtomorrow.com/us/us-bank-regulators-issue-cloud-computing-security-guidance/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "OMB Circular A-130, Managing Information as a Strategic Resource" (PDF). The White House. 28 July 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A130/a130revised.pdf. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ Coos, A. (30 April 2020). "All You Need to Know About Turkey’s Personal Data Protection Law (KVKK)". Endpoint Protector Blog. https://www.endpointprotector.com/blog/everything-you-need-to-know-about-turkeys-personal-data-protection-law/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ Ersoy, E.C.; Karakaş, M. (19 June 2020). "Cloud Computing Technologies and Its Legal Dimension". Kılınç Law and Consulting. https://www.kilinclaw.com.tr/en/cloud-computing-technologies-and-its-legal-dimension/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "The Protective Security Policy Framework". Australian Government. https://www.protectivesecurity.gov.au/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ Alpern, P. (10 February 2010). "Microsoft to Congress: Time For New Cloud Computing Laws". IndustryWeek. https://www.industryweek.com/innovation/article/21932894/microsoft-to-congress-time-for-new-cloud-computing-laws. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ 36.0 36.1 36.2 36.3 36.4 36.5 36.6 36.7 36.8 Levite, A.; Kalwani, G. (9 November 2020). "Cloud Governance Challenges: A Survey of Policy and Regulatory Issues". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/09/cloud-governance-challenges-survey-of-policy-and-regulatory-issues-pub-83124. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ Ali, O.; Osmanaj, V. (2020). "The role of government regulations in the adoption of cloud computing: A case study of local government". Computer Law & Security Review 36: 105396. doi:10.1016/j.clsr.2020.105396.
- ↑ 38.0 38.1 Cite error: Invalid
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- ↑ Mitnick, D. (10 April 2018). "No more waiting: It’s time for a federal data breach law in the U.S.". Access Now Blog. Access Now. https://www.accessnow.org/no-more-waiting-its-time-for-a-federal-data-breach-law-in-the-u-s/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ "Security Breach Notification Laws". National Conference of State Legislatures. 17 July 2020. https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ Brandom, R. (2 September 2020). "Trump’s TikTok deal has hit a serious roadblock". The Verge. https://www.theverge.com/2020/9/2/21418496/tiktok-for-you-page-algorithm-deal-us-china-trump-microsoft. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ Cox, K. (10 February 2021). "Oracle’s TikTok acquisition reportedly “shelved” indefinitely". Ars Technica. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2021/02/oracles-tiktok-acquisition-reportedly-shelved-indefinitely/. Retrieved 21 August 2021.
- ↑ 43.0 43.1 Eustice, J.C. (2018). "Understand the intersection between data privacy laws and cloud computing". Legal Technology, Products, and Services. Thomson Reuters. https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/understanding-data-privacy-and-cloud-computing. Retrieved 21 August 2021.